Republic of the Phil v Gloria Macapagal Arroyo

[atty36252]

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

Republic of the Philippines
Petitioner,


- versus – G.R. No.

Petition for Quo Warranto
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
Respondent.
x------------------------------------x

PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO

Petitioner, through undersigned public prosecutor, to the Honorable Court, respectfully petitions this Honorable Court for a writ of quo warranto directed to Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to answer to the people by what warrant she claims to hold, use, exercise and enjoy the office of President of the Republic of the Philippines.

BASIS FOR JURISDICTION

The original jurisdiction of this Honorable Court is invoked on the basis of Article VIII of the Constitution, which provides that:

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.

Pursuant to the above provision of the Constitution, this Honorable Court issued rules on the filing of petitions for quo warranto as quoted below:

RULE 66
QUO WARRANTO

Section 1. Action by Government against individuals.

An action for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against:

(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or franchise;

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 2. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor must commence action.

The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in the preceding section can be established by proof, must commence such action.

This petition is brought to this Honorable Court on the basis of the attached information, which the undersigned prosecutor files herewith. In the case of Republic v. Corpin, this Honorable Court acknowledged the fact that there are two ways by which a petition for quo warranto may be filed: (1) upon complaint, when the prosecutor has “good reasons to believe that there is proper action for quo warranto against the herein defendant”, and (2) by leave of Court (Republic v. Corpin, G.R. No. L-11600, June 27, 1958). The good reasons, it is submitted, are furnished by the attached complaint, and the affidavit of merits which detail the facts sought to be established, to support the contention of usurpation.


This case is not governed
by the 2005 Rules of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal.

The Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET Rules) provide for the filing of an election protest based on manifest error in the tallying of votes (Rule 15, PET Rules). The cause of action herein is not one of error in the appreciation of votes, but a fraud foisted on the State, by the fabrication of votes, which enabled the usurpation of the office of the president.

Neither is this petition governed by Rule 16 of the PET Rules, for the cause of action is furnished, not by the ineligibility or disloyalty of the occupant, but by the fraud, which enabled the usurpation. Clearly then, it is Rule 66 of the Rules of Court which governs this case.

This case is not filed out of time.

Although three years have passed since the perpetration of the fraud that enabled the usurpation, this petition is not out of time, for it is being brought in the name of the State. “The principle that acts of limitation do not bind the King (the State) or the people, applies to proceeding by quo warranto, the rule being that the representative of the State may file an information on behalf of the people at any time; and the lapse of time constitutes no bar to the proceeding, in conformity with the maxim Nullum tempus occurrit regi” [no time runs against the King (sovereign) Agcaoili v. Suguitan 48 Phil. 676].

The limitation, therefore, found in Rule 17 of the PET Rules, even if it states that it is jurisdictional, or that found in Section 11 of Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, applies not in this case, for the reason stated above; time runs not against the sovereign.

Additionally, the limitations provided in the afore-mentioned rules are limitations on petitions of private individuals. Rule 16 refers to a petition for quo warranto by a registered voter, while Section 11 of Rule 66 refers to “the right of the petitioner to hold such office”, which indicates a petition by a private petitioner. The Rules provide no limitation on petitions by the State.

The Resolution in P.E.T. Case No. 002
dated March 29, 2005
is no bar to this Petition.

It is true, that an election protest was filed by Ronald Allan Poe (a.k.a. Fernando Poe Jr.) in the case docketed as P.E.T. Case No. 002. That case, however, does not present a bar by res judicata, because it fails to furnish the elements of a bar by res judicata. “The elements of res judicata are:

(1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;

(2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;

(3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and

(4) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.

(Republic of the Phil. v. Ramon Yu et al G.R. No. 157557 March 10, 2006)

Three elements of the principle of res judicata do not obtain in this case as follows:

1. There was no final judgment, for the party died, and this Honorable Court denied the motion for substitution of parties;

2. The case was dismissed, so there was no decision on the merits;

3. a) The issues presented are not the same. An election protest alleges manifest error in the appreciation of the votes case, whilst this case alleges a fraud foisted on the State which enabled the usurpation of the highest office of the Republic; and

b) There is no identity of the parties, because the party in the Poe case was the late presidential candidate, while the party here is the State itself.


The Honorable Court may acquire
jurisdiction without the need for
Petitioner to pay filing fees.

Time and again, this Honorable Court has held that jurisdiction is acquired upon the payment of filing fees. That doctrine, however, does not apply when the suit is being brought in the name of the State. In the recent case of Republic of the Phil. v. Judge Vicente A. Hidalgo, this Honorable Court reiterated the ruling in Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Rafferty 39 Phil. 145 (1918) that the State does not pay costs. This doctrine follows a long line of American jurisprudence began when the Supreme Court of the United States held that: “The United States never pay costs” (U. S. vs. Barker [1817], 2 Wheat. [U. S.], 395.).

D I S C U S S I O N

In the case of Agcaoili v. Suguitan, this Honorable Court held that: “In all public matters a writ of quo warranto is a writ of right at the suit of the state, and issues as a matter of course upon demand of the proper officer, and the court has no authority to withhold leave to file a petition therefor” (Agacaoili v. Suguitan 48 Phil. 676).

The Court went further to explain that: “The ancient writ of quo warranto was a high prerogative writ in the nature of a writ of right by the King (sovereign) against any one who usurped or claimed any office, franchise or liberty of the crown, to inquire by what authority the usurper supported his claim, in order to determine the right.”

The Constitution dictates that the President shall be elected by direct vote of the people (Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 1). The person who garners the highest number of votes cast in the election for the office shall be proclaimed the president (Article VII, section 4, paragraph 5). One who occupies the office on the strength of votes fabricated, and therefore, never cast, cannot be said to be entitled to the office. Said holder is a mere usurper who may be ousted upon the order of this Honorable Court.

A case of dagdag-bawas (vote padding and shaving) is not unique to the Philippines, nor is it without precedent in history. The proclamation of a governor on the strength of manufactured votes and fictitious precincts was the issue presented in the case of The Attorney General ex. rel. Bashford v. Barstow [4 Wis. 567, 1855 WL 1929 (Wis.)] before the Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin.

The facts of the case, as summarized by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in the recent case of Mark Green v. State of Wisconsin Board of Elections (2007 WI 45, April 25, 2007) are as follows:

The case involved a disputed election for governor in which the court in essence removed a governor from office.

In 1855 Governor William A. Barstow ran for re-election. Although his party dominated Wisconsin politics, Barstow had apparently antagonized many voters, and he ran well behind the rest of the ticket. The election was very close and remained unresolved for weeks. On December 17, 1855, the last day allowed by law, the state board of canvassers certified Barstow's reelection by 157 votes.

Barstow's opponent, Coles Bashford, claimed fraud. He asserted that slow returns from Chippewa, Waupaca, and several other northern counties contained fictitious precincts and manufactured votes. Bashford moved to file a writ of quo warranto in the supreme court, challenging Barstow's election and his right to hold the office of governor.

The newly elected attorney general took control of the quo warranto so that a member of Barstow's party could manage the action. Eventually, however, he stepped aside.

Barstow vigorously opposed the court's jurisdiction to hear the case. When the court decided otherwise, Barstow refused to file a substantive answer, thereby permitting a default judgment. Barstow's attorneys withdrew after delivering a communication from Barstow threatening to resist any removal order from the court "with all the force vested in this department."

The court was not deterred. Rather than enter a default against Barstow, however, it required Bashford to make his proofs and demonstrate his title to office. He did. [Mark Green v. State of Wisconsin Board of Elections (2007 WI 45, April 25, 2007)

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin accorded the canvass the status of presumptive correctness, and stated that: “we have considered the canvass of the vote for governor by the state canvassers as correct, granting the relator permission, however, to impeach it by testimony” [Bashford v. Barstow [4 Wis. 567, 1855 WL 1929 (Wis.)].

“Once the ‘irregularities and fraudulent returns were amply proven,’ the court entered judgment” [Mark Green v. State of Wisconsin Board of Elections (2007 WI 45, April 25, 2007) quoting Bashford v. Barstow 4 Wis. 567, 1855 WL 1929 (Wis.)].

On Barstow’s contention that the Court did not have jurisdiction, the Court, through Chief Justice Edward Whiton, observed that the court "is the mere instrument provided by the constitution to ascertain and enforce [Bashford's and Barstow's] rights as fixed by that instrument. Its office is the same as in all controversies between party and party; not to create rights, but to ascertain and enforce them" [Mark Green v. State of Wisconsin Board of Elections (2007 WI 45, April 25, 2007) quoting The Attorney General ex. rel. Bashford v. Barstow 4 Wis. 567, 1855 WL 1929 (Wis.)].

The Respondent also contended that the canvass of votes was conclusive as to his right to occupy the office of governor. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, however, ruled that it is the votes cast and not those canvassed that entitle a person to the office of governor, by stating that:

"Bearing in mind, then, that under our constitution and laws, it is the election to an office, and not the canvass of the votes, which determines the right to the office, we will proceed to inquire into the proceedings of the state canvassers, by which they determined that the respondent was duly elected” [The Attorney General ex. rel. Bashford v. Barstow 4 Wis. 567, 1855 WL 1929 (Wis.)].

Impeachment is not the proper remedy.

Although Section 2. of Article XI of the Constitution provides for impeachment as the sole process by which a president may be removed, that presumes the removal of a validly elected president. One who is a mere usurper, we submit, need not be impeached, for the usurper enjoys not, any of the privileges of the usurped office.

The attached affidavit of merits details the massive fraud foisted upon the State to rob candidate Ronald Allan Poe of his rightful election, enabling the Respondent Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to usurp the highest office of the Republic. More than the damage to the late candidate, it is the sovereign people who have sustained the greater damage, when their will was thwarted by a fraud most vile and most brazen.

To rule that there is no remedy, that the sovereign people must wait out the full term of the usurped office, before the usurper may be ousted, is to state that the Constitution is an irrelevant piece of paper. It is to state that the sovereign is so impotent that it must suffer the insults of a mendacious recreant.


WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court, that:

1. Summons be served on the Respondent requiring her to answer the complaint accompanying this petition;

2. The Republic be allowed to impeach the canvass of votes by evidence, both oral and documentary; and

3. Once the irregularities and fraudulent returns are amply proven, to pronounce the ouster of the Respondent.

Juan De La Cruz
Public Prosecutor